Use amnesia, bodily duplication, and unfamiliar experience to compare accounts of the self in terms of soul, consciousness, process, and subjectivity.
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Early Buddhist not-self tradition · Not-self discourses and Abhidharma analysis
If experiences form a causal stream, must we posit an unchanging owner behind it?
Indian Buddhist theories analyze mental life as interrelated physical and psychological processes rather than the activity of an independent, enduring substantial self.
The text is a Korean-English summary of the source, not a direct quotation.
Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: Introduction; §1 History of the Issue
Open sourceLater notions such as mind-stream, life-continuum mind, and repository consciousness seek to explain continuity and karma without reinstating a permanent self.
The text is a Korean-English summary of the source, not a direct quotation.
Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: §1.1 The Not-Self Doctrine; §5 Theories of Mind
Open sourceNot-self analysis opens a tradition that treats persons as aggregates and causal processes.
From the fifth century BCE
René Descartes · Meditations on First Philosophy
If every bodily fact is doubted, does the thinking self remain, and could it exist without the body?
Descartes structures the Meditations to withdraw from the senses through doubt and reach certainty about the thinking subject.
The text is a Korean-English summary of the source, not a direct quotation.
René Descartes
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: §4.2 The Meditations; Meditation II
Open sourceThe Sixth Meditation argument for real distinction treats mind and body as non-identical and argues for the possibility of their existing apart.
The text is a Korean-English summary of the source, not a direct quotation.
Descartes' Modal Metaphysics
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: §5 Real Distinction; AT 7:78, CSM 2:54
Open sourceThe Latin Meditations appears in Paris and places the mind-body distinction at center stage.
1641 · Paris · 출판
John Locke · Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.xxvii
If consciousness cannot reach a past action, is the present person the one who performed it?
Locke connects personal identity to the extent that consciousness reaches backward to past actions or thoughts.
The text is a Korean-English summary of the source, not a direct quotation.
Locke on Personal Identity
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: §1 Locke on Persons and Personal Identity; Essay II.xxvii.9
Open sourceThis account separates personal identity from the persistence of the same immaterial soul and has generated competing interpretations of consciousness and substance.
The text is a Korean-English summary of the source, not a direct quotation.
Locke on Personal Identity
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: §1 The Basics; §2 Locke on Persons: What’s Up for Debate
Open sourceThe second edition of the Essay adds the chapter on identity and diversity.
1694
Thomas Nagel · What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
After every observable fact is collected, does the fact of what it is like for that creature remain?
Nagel characterizes a conscious organism as one for which there is something it is like to be that organism.
The text is a Korean-English summary of the source, not a direct quotation.
What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
Thomas Nagel · 1974
Locator: pp. 436–438
Open sourceThe bat case asks how objective physical explanation could include the subjective character of experience; it does not deny that bats have experiences.
The text is a Korean-English summary of the source, not a direct quotation.
Animal Consciousness
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: §2.2 Phenomenal Consciousness; discussion of Nagel 1974
Open sourceNagel's article makes the subjective character of consciousness a central problem in philosophy of mind.
October 1974