Goodman — Rival descriptions of the same evidence
The question that opens it
With the same observations, why treat some classifications as guides to the future but not others?
- 1
“A Query on Confirmation” appeared in 1946 in `The Journal of Philosophy`, volume 43, issue 14, pages 383–385.
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A Query on Confirmation
Nelson Goodman · 1946 · The Journal of Philosophy 43(14), 383–385
Locator: Article metadata, pages 383–385
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- 2
Harvard University Press's edition of `Fact, Fiction, and Forecast` was published in Cambridge in 1955.
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Review of Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, & Forecast
R. M. Martin · 1960 · Journal of Symbolic Logic 25(3), bibliographic review record
Locator: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1955, 126 pages
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- 3
Green emeralds observed before the reference time can be described, under the same observational facts, as satisfying both the predicates `green` and `grue`.
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Fact, Fiction, and Forecast
Nelson Goodman · 1983 · Fourth edition, Harvard University Press
Locator: “The New Riddle of Induction,” pages 72–75
Open sourceThe Problem of Induction
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: Section 4.2
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- 4
Applying the same simple-enumeration schema, the two descriptions lead to incompatible predictions about emeralds after the reference time.
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Fact, Fiction, and Forecast
Nelson Goodman · 1983 · Fourth edition, Harvard University Press
Locator: “The New Riddle of Induction,” pages 73–75
Open sourceThe Problem of Induction
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: Section 4.2
Open source
- 5
The case shows that induction concerns not only the number of observations but also which predicates and regularities may be projected to unobserved cases.
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Fact, Fiction, and Forecast
Nelson Goodman · 1983 · Fourth edition, Harvard University Press
Locator: “The New Riddle of Induction,” pages 75–83
Open sourceThe Problem of Induction
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: Section 4.2
Open source
- 6
Goodman develops this as a `new riddle` added to Hume's problem, asking which way for the future to resemble the past is legitimate.
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Fact, Fiction, and Forecast
Nelson Goodman · 1983 · Fourth edition, Harvard University Press
Locator: “The New Riddle of Induction,” pages 59–83
Open sourceThe Problem of Induction
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: Section 4.2
Open source