한
All perspectives

1946–1955

Goodman — Rival descriptions of the same evidence

With the same observations, why treat some classifications as guides to the future but not others?

Nelson GoodmanA Query on ConfirmationFact, Fiction, and Forecast

Evidence-backed account

“A Query on Confirmation” appeared in 1946 in `The Journal of Philosophy`, volume 43, issue 14, pages 383–385.

Open evidence

This is an evidence-linked editorial paraphrase, not a direct quotation.

  • A Query on Confirmation

    Nelson Goodman · 1946 · The Journal of Philosophy 43(14), 383–385

    Locator: Article metadata, pages 383–385

    Open source

Harvard University Press's edition of `Fact, Fiction, and Forecast` was published in Cambridge in 1955.

Open evidence

This is an evidence-linked editorial paraphrase, not a direct quotation.

  • Review of Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, & Forecast

    R. M. Martin · 1960 · Journal of Symbolic Logic 25(3), bibliographic review record

    Locator: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1955, 126 pages

    Open source

Green emeralds observed before the reference time can be described, under the same observational facts, as satisfying both the predicates `green` and `grue`.

Open evidence

This is an evidence-linked editorial paraphrase, not a direct quotation.

  • Fact, Fiction, and Forecast

    Nelson Goodman · 1983 · Fourth edition, Harvard University Press

    Locator: “The New Riddle of Induction,” pages 72–75

    Open source

  • The Problem of Induction

    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

    Locator: Section 4.2

    Open source

Applying the same simple-enumeration schema, the two descriptions lead to incompatible predictions about emeralds after the reference time.

Open evidence

This is an evidence-linked editorial paraphrase, not a direct quotation.

  • Fact, Fiction, and Forecast

    Nelson Goodman · 1983 · Fourth edition, Harvard University Press

    Locator: “The New Riddle of Induction,” pages 73–75

    Open source

  • The Problem of Induction

    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

    Locator: Section 4.2

    Open source

The case shows that induction concerns not only the number of observations but also which predicates and regularities may be projected to unobserved cases.

Open evidence

This is an evidence-linked editorial paraphrase, not a direct quotation.

  • Fact, Fiction, and Forecast

    Nelson Goodman · 1983 · Fourth edition, Harvard University Press

    Locator: “The New Riddle of Induction,” pages 75–83

    Open source

  • The Problem of Induction

    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

    Locator: Section 4.2

    Open source

Goodman develops this as a `new riddle` added to Hume's problem, asking which way for the future to resemble the past is legitimate.

Open evidence

This is an evidence-linked editorial paraphrase, not a direct quotation.

  • Fact, Fiction, and Forecast

    Nelson Goodman · 1983 · Fourth edition, Harvard University Press

    Locator: “The New Riddle of Induction,” pages 59–83

    Open source

  • The Problem of Induction

    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

    Locator: Section 4.2

    Open source
Return to the full question