Kripke — Names and descriptions under counterfactual conditions
The question that opens it
Could the same name still refer to the object if that object did not satisfy the description?
- 1
The core of Naming and Necessity is associated with the 1970 Princeton lectures and was followed by a 1972 transcript/article and the 1980 book.
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Vale Saul Kripke, 1940–2022
Princeton University Department of Philosophy
Locator: 1970 Princeton Three Lecture Series
Open sourceNaming and Necessity
Saul A. Kripke · 1980 · Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980; WorldCat record OCLC 5726909
Locator: Harvard University Press, 1980 edition metadata
Open sourceReference
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: Bibliography: Kripke 1972 and 1980
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- 2
A rigid designator is explained as an expression that designates the same object, and no other object, across possible situations in which that object exists.
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Rigid Designators
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: Sections 1.1–1.2
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- 3
In a standard Kripkean comparison, the proper names Hesperus and Phosphorus are rigid, whereas an ordinary description may be satisfied by different objects in different situations.
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Rigid Designators
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: Section 1.1
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- 4
An identity between two rigid names can be necessary if true, even though learning that identity may require empirical discovery.
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Rigid Designators
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: Sections 1.1 and 3.1
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- 5
A description may be used to fix a reference initially without being synonymous with the name.
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Naming and Necessity
Saul A. Kripke · 1980 · Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980; WorldCat record OCLC 5726909
Locator: Pages 54–56
Open sourceRigid Designators
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: Section 2.2.2
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- 6
Cases in which a speaker can ask about a person using a transmitted name without knowing a uniquely identifying description are used against descriptivism.
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Reference
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Locator: Section 2.1
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